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When Bismarck said that politics was the art o£ the possible 
it is highly.unlikely that he had environmental politics in mind, 
or that he would have even recognised the meaning o£ the term, 
but the course of the last few years in Scotland suggests that the 
aphorism is as true in environmental affairs as it is in the wider 
field of world politics. But to start with a definition, in this 
article the term "environmental" is used in the same way as in 
'Department of the Environment', to include housing and planning, 
and indeed some aspects of transport, the Scottish Office having 
adopted this grouping of functions before, and retained it after, 
Whitehall. It thus reflects the entire range o£ responsibilities 
of Scottish Ministers and the Scottish Office for the built envir-
onment as well as the ought-not-to-be-built environment . 
The essence o£ the argument is that the power of governments 
to achieve their objectives is not solely determined by the parlia-
mentary situation and the command of financial resources, as con-
stitutional theory sometimes suggests. The implementation o£ poli-
cies depends on a number of other significant factors, such as 
the inherent nature of the problem and whether it is amenable to 
legislative and executive action, the powers and rights of pressure 
groups and local interests, the attitude of local authorities, and 
the force of public opinion expressing itself through pressure on 
Ministers, MPs, and Party workers. As a result the degree o£ 
success achieved in recent environmental policy in Scotland has 
varied very substantially. 
Nothing more clearly demonstrates the power of a government 
to achieve certain objectives and to ignore the consensus views of 
local authorities and some influential pressure groups than the 
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steps taken under the Tenants' Rights Etc (Scotland) Act 1980 to 
confer on public sector tenants the right to buy the houses in 
which they live, and security of tenure if they remain tenants. 
This controverts the view frequently expressed that the interplay 
of group pressures dominates policies. It is true that the Conser-
vative Party was completely united on the issue of the right to buy
Party advocacy of this has been raised in the past few years from 
the level of a mere policy to that of unassailable dogma, and the 
Conservative Government was in no danger of a revolt by its back-
benchers, except on peripheral issues such as the sale of houses 
in rural areas, unlike the Labour Governments of 1974-1979, many 
of whose backbenchers were distinctly unhappy even about the limit-
ed authorisations granted to local authorities to sell, and the 
proposals to grant security of tenure. But the rea-
sons for the success of the policy went beyond the possession of a 
parliamentary majority; they included the facts that any threat of 
repeal, an Opposition's ultimate weapon, could not affect those who 
had already bought, and that the Government was proposing to confer 
a right on the public, or a large section of it, rather than to re-
strict rights. Much legislation imposes obligations on citizens, or 
has unwelcome side effects such as higher taxes, rates, or rents, 
but here we had legislation conferring rights which can be nothing 
but beneficial to those who decide to exercise them, and do not 
hurt others except on a long-term view of the stock of council 
houses. Furthermore the right was of a kind which could if necessary 
be operated through the Lands Tribunal without the co-operation of 
the housing authorities, an ingenious and far-seeing device. No 
doubt these were some of the reasons why, as early as March 1981, 
recalcitrant authorities were submitting to the Secretary of State's 
exercise of his default powers rather than seeking Clay-Cross-type 
martyrdom. Perhaps also this is why the vehement opposition of 
Shelter, who had so successfully secured legislation on homeless-
ness, was this time quite ineffective. Significantly, too, local 
authorities were also unable to resist the other aspects of the 
Tenants' Rights Act, namely statutory security of tenure for coun-
cil tenants, and other provisions of the "tenants" charter". This 
was a bit more surprising,since this policy, taken over from the 
Labour Government was opposed by some Conservative Councils, but 
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the Government remained quite firm. 
Clearly the incremental theory - that policy changes 
which take place tend to be such as modify past policies only by 
degrees - hardly applies to the major reversal of policy between 
governments on the sale of council houses. Nor has it much bearing 
on council house rent policy. Labour, in 1974, took the pressure 
off councils to raise the proportion of housing costs met by rents, 
which went down from 55.8% in 1973-4 to 45.7% in 1976-7. The Con-
servatives tried exhortation for a year or so, but this did not 
prevent the figure going down to 44.2% in 1979-80~ 1 ) In 1980 they 
therefore adopted a radically new measure. The circular announcing 
housing capital allocations for 1981-2(
2
) trimmed allocations to 
individual authorities by the amount of shortfall in rent income 
(or part of it in special cases such as Glasgow). Low rent in-
creases will thus in future mean a severe limitation on council 
house building and modernisation in the area concerned.In fact,the 
Scottish Office could have achieved the same result, and avoided 
the opprobrium of cutting council housing, if they had said that 
councils could build as much as they wanted provided the finance, 
above a certain level, was secured without further public expen-
diture, that is by raising rents, but this would perhaps have 
offended public expenditure conventions Time will show how far 
councils will put up their rents in order to avoid capital puni-
shment, but it would be surprising if the Government's objective 
is fully achieved, since attitudes to housing in Scotland make 
raising rents much more unpopular to the majority of councils 
than raising rates. 
Unlike the legislative measures taken by the Conservative 
Government of 1970-74 to force local authorities to raise rents, 
the new device is one over which the Government has complete 
control, namely the level of capital investment. The Government 
can use its executive power to bring down the amount of public 
sector investment to any level which it thinks fit, and indeed 
housing has felt the brunt of Government policy to reduce public 
expenditure more than any other programme. It is, of course, a 
negative control, in the sense that it cannot force local authori-
ties to invest more in housing or any other service than they wish 














office, when the level of building activity by local authorities 
was probably falling more sharply than the Government would have 
wished (although the savings in public expenditure were welcome). 
However, one suspects it will be a long time before a government -
of any complexion - is begging local authorities to increase capi-
tal expenditure, so this limitation is of little consequence. 
Turning to the policies of local authorities for allocating 
their housing stock, Government action has so far proved ineffec-
tive, although 1980 produced legislation which may secure substan-
tial changes. No government for the past 20 years at least has 
satisfied with the restrictive, not to say parochial, policies pur-
sued by local authorities in the allocation of houses to their own 
constituents and to certain favoured categories among those consti-
tuents. Time after time governments have sponsored reports by the 
Scottish Housing Advisory Committee, advocating the removal of 
restrictions on eligibility and more willingness to offer houses 
to incomers, all to remarkably little effect. The local authority 
housing stock still takes the form of 50 or more separate housing 
pools, each with its own rules for admission and very little pro-
vision for interchangeability. A significant advanc~ however, was 
made by Tenants• Rights Act, which abolished residential qualifi-
cations and required that many categories of incomers, including 
those seeking a job or already having one in the area, shall be 
treated in the same way as those already in the area. These meas-
ures were introduced and became law while the latest sub-committee 
of SHAC established under the Labour administration, was still de-
liberating, although its report( 3 ) implicitly approved them. They 
make a big change in the statutory position, but it will be sur-
prising if actual practice matches legislative requirements. 
Opening the housing lists to a wider range of people damages est-
ablished expectations, and this may continue to be a compelling 
pressure on councillors. 
The history of the private landlord sector of housing 
the past 50 or 60 years, as Roy Parker has pointed out( 4 ), 
over 
demon-
strates how easy it can be to take temporary measures to secure an 
objective rent restriction and security of tenure - and how 
difficult to modify later the less welcome results of that action. 
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conservative thinking as a whole, and at least Labour front bench 
thinking, regrets the perennial decline in the private rented sec-
tor both in quantity and quality which has ensued, as a result of 
landlords being unwilling or unable to invest in improvement and 
maintenance and anxious to sell as soon as they g2t the chance. The 
fair rents system was intended to halt the decline, while protect-
ing existing tenants, but has failed to do so, and even the present 
government has found it impossib::.e to take measures which would do 
more than marginally affect the decline. In the first place they 
are limited by the promise in their manifesto to maintain the sec-
urity of existing tenants. In the second place the legislation in-
cluded in the Tenants• Rights etc. (Scotland) Act to create a new 
category of short-term tenancies is restricted both by the fact that 
the rents are to be not uncontrolled but "fair", and by the Labour 
threat to repeal the system. This must make potential new land-
lords, on whom the Conservatives are relying, think twice before 
letting their property. Unlike council house purchase, this is an 
area where Opposition pledges to repeal can be effective, since 
permanent security of tenure can be granted to tenants who came in 
on a shorthol basis by a very simple piece of legislation. 
If it is difficult to generalise about the success of recent 
Scottish administrations in achieving their objectives in housing, 
it is equally difficult with regard to town and country planning. 
Not that some things prove too difficult; for example, the in-
coming Conservative Government, like its predecessors in earlier 
decades, immediately dismantled the system of recouping develop-
ment values for the benefit of the community which had been estab-
lished under the Community Land Act. This merely involved with-
drawing capital allocations for the scheme and subsequently repeal-
ing it in legislation secured by a comfortable parliamentary major~ 
ty. The community land system, of course, had not established it-
self in favour to any great extent; the possibility of financial 
return on land bought for development by local authorities was too 
distant, and the scale on which the Labour Government had been 
able to permit investment was too small to creat~ any significant 
effect. One can safely predict that no more will be done about 
the problem of private gain from publicly created land values under 
a Conservative administration and after three unsuccessful attempts 
241 
since the Second World War it is doubtful whether a Labour admini
tration would try again. 
Government success in the field of the preparation of town and
country plans must be regarded as relatively limited. Structure 
plans for a good deal of Scotland, notably Strathclyde and the 
Lothians, were submitted and approved in 1978-1980 with relative-
ly minor modifications, but progress in the preparation of local 
plans, which are the essential means of translating planning poli-
cies into action, has been lamentably slow. It would seem that 
District Planning Authorities are too preoccupied with day-to-day 
planning applications, or have allowed themselves to become too 
much involved in detail, and they are certainly under heavy Gov-
ernment pressure to reduce staff. It looks as if the objective of 
covering the country with both strategic and tactical plans to 
guide development will not be fully secured for a long time, un-
like the highly successful completion of regional reports in l976-
78,and neither administration has been prepared to give the matter 
much priority. 
It is in any case specific major planning applications rather 
than the formal structure plans which attract the concern of most 
Ministers. 
The power to ·call in a planning application from a 
local authority for their own decision is the major power avail-
able to Ministers in this regard, and the most important example of
this in recent years in Scotland has been the Moss Morran/Braefoot 
Bay petrochemical development. This deserves a book in itself but 
the main points to be made in this brief study of the effective-
ness of government policy are that a planning application for the 
development, strongly supported by the Department of Energy and 
the local authorities ( and no doubt by the Secretary of State for 
Scotland, had he not been constrained from expressing an opinion 
by his quasi-judicial responsibilities) was submitted in mid-1977. 
It was not,however, granted and put beyond the possibility of fur-
ther legal challenge until February 1980, owing to the skilful ex-
ploitation by a local, highly-motivated (and self-financed) group 
of objectors of an issue which had not been raised or even recog-
nised at the public inquiry. But for this, the planning application 
would have been granted early in 1978. As it was, the Secretary of 
State could do no more than indicate at that time that he was pre-
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pared to grant planning permission subject to considering repres-
entations on the new issue, a process expected originally to take 
only a month or two. The new issue was the evidence that under cer-
tain circumstances a leak of petrochemical gases might be ignited 
by radio transmissions, and in view of the fact that the Government 
had suspended racio transmissions from the defence installa-
tion at Crimond because of its proximity to the St Fergus Gas 
Terminal, the Secretary of State could not refuse to have this 
issue examined in regard to Moss Morran and Braefoot Bay. He de-
surprisingly, without reopening the public 
probably took longer than a resumed in-
cided to do so, somewhat 
inquiry. This in the end 
quiry would have taken, owing to the meticulous care with which 
the Scottish Office had to circulate all representations and per-
counter-representations, lest the decision was invalidated as mit 
contrary to natural justice. At one stage a judge did indicate 
that this might occur if the Secretary of State did not allow more 
time for representations. However, after lengthy consideration of 
reports by the Health and Safety Executive (flaws in which were 
identified by the objectors and used to secure further delay) 
planning permission was 
cised a right of appeal 
cedural faults, but the 
given in August 1979. The objectors exer-
to the Court of Session on grounds of pro-
care taken by the Scottish Office led to 
the appeal being rejected. The Government's objective was thus 
eventually secured, but there had been times when the develop-
er's threat to pull out because of the delays seemed a real one. 
The other main planning application which had implications of 
a major kind was, formally speaking, for boring a few holes in the 
ground near Loch Doon for research purposes and then going away 
after clearing up the mess. This has become embroiled with the 
whole issue of disposal of radioactive waste and the nuclear power 
progra!lL--ne as a whole. The Labour Government clearly did not want 
and refused to call in from the local to take on this issue, 
authority the planning application by the UK Atomic Energy Auth-
ority for the research drilling, but the incoming Conservative 
administration could not refuse to consider the appeal which was 
lodged when the application was refused. 
Despite intense campaigning, and pointed references to 




proceeding too hastily, the public inquiry was concerned solely w
the direct environmental effects of the test bores. A statement(S) 
was issued that the inquiry reporter's recommendations would not 
cover any wider issues although he allowed considerable discussion 
of them. The inquiry was held in February 1980, but up to the time 
this article was written no decision had been announced, and it is 
easy to guess the degree of embarrassment and difficulty which the 
decision-making must have caused. While it may be necessary to con-
duct research to assess, in the long term, the feasibility of dis-
posing of radioactive waste underground, among other possibilities, 
there is no denying the deep concern which even the initial steps 
arouse. Since the benefits of research, whatever they are, are not 
to be reaped within 20 years or more it is asking a lot of poli-
ticians to make a highly unpopular decision now. The Secretary of 
State for Scotland is, furthermore, in a highly exposed position 
he finds himself pressed to grant planning permission in advance 
planning permission for test bores in England. This may well be an 
area where the pressure of groups and local interests opposed to 
nuclear power and its by-products are the dominating feature. 
Dissatisfaction of a different sort arises in formulating 
carrying out policy towards inner city areas, arising not so much 
conflicts about objectives as the difficulTy in achieving re-
sults. Indeed inner cities are a prime example of the limitations 
of government effectiveness in an area where environmental and 
social problems are huge, complex and intractable. Over the years 
a large array of special schemes and powers have been devised to 
improve the physical condition and the social and economic circum-
stances of inner cities - the once popular but now discredited 
programme of comprehensive clearance and redevelopment, the urban 
programme grants system, the partnerships between central and 
local government (of which the Glasgow Eastern Area Renewal scheme 
was the first but not so called), the additional powers given to 
local authorities under the Inner Urban Areas Act, and the present 
Government's plans for Enterprise Zones and Urban Development Cor-
porations. The original policy of clearance, as a preliminary to 
comprehensive redevelopment, was so successful that it is often 
regarded as the cause of all subsequent inner city problems, be-
cause in the current vogue for rehabilitation it is difficult to 
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remember just how intolerable and incapable of improvement a large, 
proportion of the old city tenements had become, and how essential 
it was to reduce the density of population before any type of im-
provement could be contemplated. It would be more pertinent to 
cite the perennial decay of the older industries as the prime 
cause of dereliction and here, of course, governments are faced 
with a problem which has so far proved incapable of solution in 
a stagnant or declining economy, in spite of the tremendous efforts 
devoted to fostering new city industry. These efforts, and the 
work done with the aid of urban programme grant, must be judged 
a means of slowi~g down, or at best preventing, the further deter-
ioration of inner city areas rather than a means of rebuilding the 
economic and social fabric. It is too early yet to see whether 
Enterprise Zones (which at least have a catchy name in their fa-
vour) will be more effective. Urban Deveiopment Corporations have 
not so far been adopted in Scotland; a Conservative working group 
had advocated one for the GEAR area but the Government found 
Strathclyde and Glasgow District resolutely opposed to a new auth-
ority, and eventually accepted that to impose one would delay pro-
gress on the ground. Support for the GEAR project as it was ori-
ginally organised, on a purely advisory and cooperative basis, was 
confirmed(
6 l. It would be wrong to dismiss it as ineffective, since 
it is bound to take years for a project centred on an intensely 
difficult area, and requiring the co-operation of a large number 
of local authorities and goveinment agencies, to achieve its ob-
jectives. It has long been clear, however, that in spite of the 
support given to it by both Labour and Conservative Ministers, its 
success will be restricted by restraints on capital and current 
expenditure. In these circumstances the top-level coordinating 
machinery of GEAR has virtually ceased to function, for the pres-
ent at least. 
It has proved much easier for governments to build roads than 
to rebuild communities. Because the economic benefits are seen as 
outweighing damage to the environment, there has been only a frac-
tion of the objection in Scotland to new trunk roads which has been 
demonstrated in England and Wales. The interests criticising high 
spending on roads are not so much opposed to roads in themselves 






ments of the 70s therefore broadly carried through, although with 
some delay, the programme of motorway and trunk road construction 
set out in the White Paper Scottish Roads in the 1970s published
at the end of the previous decade. In the last two years the pro-
gramme has had to take on the additional Conservative Manifesto 
commitment of dualling the road southwards from Aberdeen, and on 
the whole appears to be avoiding the worst of the public expendi-
ture cuts. 
This does not however lend much weight to the Crossman view 
that departments have their own preferences which they force dn 
Ministers, since housing, a subject in which the Scottish Develop-
ment Department is just as interested as roads, has of course 
changed direction radically under the present Government. 
Local opinion has had much more effect on the design of ur-
ban roads than on trunk roads. The completion of the Glasgow inner 
ring road has been stopped by the strength of certain sections of 
public opinion, as evinced at the inquiry into the Strathclyde 
Structure Plan, which led the Secretary of State to delete the 
eastern link when approving the Plan.(?) Edinburgh finds itself 
governed by a regional administration which takes its support of 
public transport and its opposition to road building to lengths 
which must embarrass a lot of its own supporters, and the govern-
ment-built trunk roads and motorways around the city will feed 
into a roads system which is to have only minor improvements. 
Nevertheless the Government accepted this situation by approving 
the structure plan(
8 J, and of course, given their own monetary 
policy, they could hardly have insisted on Lothian iqcreasing its 
capital expenditure. 
It has never been clear to what extent governments, of either 
complexion, would really like to foster major investment in public 
transport. Certainly the public transport lobby has been unable to 
achieve its aim of a transfer of some 50 per cent of roads expen-
diture to rail, bus and other forms of public transport, and the 
Scottish Bus Group has been subjected by the present Government 
to financial targets more relevant to a fully commercial under-
taking than to a subsidised service. This has been the cause of 
much complaint by some regional authorities, who are asked to pay 
subsidy for local services in order to bolster up the rate of 
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return on SBG investment. 
In one aspect of transport policy, the Conservatives, in 
their 1979 election Manifesto for Scotland, made a specific comm-
itment which seems to have caused some problems, considering the 
length of time taken to make a decision. This was the promise to 
move closer towards the road equivalent tariff concept in subsi-
dising transport to the Islands. A consultative document was pub-
lished in March 1980( 9 ), but was much more non-committal than the 
election Manifesto, which promised to move closer to road equiva-
lent tariffs. The consultative document revealed that the more dis-
tant islands were getting sea transport at a cost less than that 
of the road equivalent, and suggested that sea transport tariffs 
based directly on road travel costs for similar lengths of jour-
ney would remove incentives to efficiency and economy on the part 
of the transport undertakings, which would be guaranteed sub-
sidy equivalent to the difference between their own costs, however 
high, and road equivalent costs. There was also an indication that 
whatever system was adopted might best be confined to freight only. 
Up to May, 1981 no decision had been announced by the Government, 
although some increases in the amount of subsidy paid under the 
current system had been granted. Constraints on public expenditure 
may have played some part in the delay, but it would seem that the 
Conservative Ministers found the problem more complex and diffi-
cult than they had assumed before they took office. 
A brief survey of a short period is no basis from which to 
deduce laws about the success and failure in politics, environ-
mental or otherwise, but some hypotheses suggest themselves. For 
some purposes, a Parliamentary majority remains a pre-requisite, 
especially where the objective can be readily attained by legisla-
tion or control over public expenditure, and the threat of repeal 
by the Opposition is ineffective. Pressure groups can have local 
or temporary success, but not if they are in conflict with a de-
termined government. Governments are likely to be more successful 
in achieving their objects if they administer the function direct-
ly than if they have to act through local authorities. Above all, 
in present circumstances, a policy which costs money is only like-
ly to be successfully pursued if it is one of the favoured few 
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